Theory of Architecture
Contemporary Positions

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In honor of architectural theorist Eduard Führ
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The following essay is about investigating historical texts – particularly specific words, terms, and concepts in these texts – as a way to pursue architectural theory. In the historical disciplines, such investigations have become very popular in the second half of the twentieth century, most famously by Michel Foucault with his analyses of historical discourses and Reinhart Koselleck with his emphasis on historical concepts (Begriffe). Also in architecture, we find numerous examples of such investigations in the writings of architectural historians and theorists; to name only a few: Jan Pieper’s discussion of “the labyrinthine” in 1987, Kenneth Frampton’s investigation of “tectonics” in 1995, and Eduard Führ’s discussion of “architectura” in 2002. Adrian Forty’s Words and Buildings: A Vocabulary of Modern Architecture of 2000 not only introduced a set of concepts of modernism, but also provided a general critique of investigating concepts and words in architectural discourse. Overall, however, in architectural history and theory we rarely come across a discussion of the very methods for analyzing concepts manifested in historical texts. The following essay is therefore an attempt to understand how we can adopt Koselleck’s approach to historical concepts for architectural theory. It focuses on three sets of questions:

1. What is meant when we speak of “concepts”? Why did Forty refer to “words,” Koselleck to “concepts,” Foucault to “discourses,” and Quentin Skinner to “ideas”? How do they differ?
2. What methods are used in the investigation of historical concepts, discourses, and ideas? And how can they be utilized for or adapted to architectural theory?
3. What kind of architectural theory is addressed? How do the outcomes relate to architecture? And what are the limitations of this kind of architectural theory?

While investigating these three sets of questions, it seems important to acknowledge upfront the extended fields behind conceptual history. Conceptual history overlaps with and cannot be sharply distinguished from social history and linguistics, to name only two major disciplines. Both of them have strong direct influences on architectural theory, too, if we think, for example, of Charles Jencks and George Baird’s discussion of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s sign theory or, more generally, the impact of the “linguistic turn” on architecture. Rather than describing and analyzing the complex relationships to these other fields, the goal of this essay is, at best, to take a narrow look at the methods of conceptual history and refer to other disciplines only when they help clarify these methods. The essay focuses on Koselleck’s very specific understanding of the history of concepts as the “record of how their uses were subsequently maintained, altered, or transformed” in written documents.

Words, Terms, Concepts, Discourses, and Ideas

The story of conceptual history starts with Koselleck’s introduction to the seminal 9,000-page publication Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Basic Concepts in History: A Dictionary on Historical Principles of Political and Social Language in Germany). Published between 1972 and 1997 by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe has just celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its completion and remains an invaluable source for the study of concepts in history. Koselleck’s hypothesis was that historical processes are reflected in concepts and that history can therefore be interpreted through the concepts that evolved in a particular time. Concepts and history have a strong relationship, but are not identical; the interpretation of this relationship helps understand historical epochs, on the one hand, and concepts in their change over time, on the other. As Ute Daniel put it: “Conceptual history deals with the convergence of concept and history.”
Conceptual history focuses on the vocabulary used in historical texts. It tries to understand the meaning of particular words as they are used in specific discourses and how these words were able to condense to important concepts in a given time and context. It assumes that “concepts are expressed in words,” meaning “that they are always tied to words” and that we therefore best understand concepts when we trace the use of words. There is a difference between “concepts” and “words,” however, which Koselleck described as follows:

“A concept can be attached to a word, but it is simultaneously more than a word. […] In a concept […] the multifarious quality of historical reality enters into the ambiguity of a word in such a manner that this reality can be understood and conceptualized only in that word. A word may have several possible meanings, but a concept combines in itself an abundance of meanings. Thus a concept may be clear, but it must be ambiguous. It bundles together the richness of historical experience and the sum of theoretical and practical lessons drawn from it in such a way that their relationship can be established and properly understood only through a concept. To put it most succinctly: the meaning of words can be defined exactly, but concepts can only be interpreted.”

In *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Koselleck also speaks of “core concepts” (Kernbegriffe), “central concepts” (zentrale Begriffe), “leading terms” (Leitbegriffe), “key words” (Schlüsselworte), “slogans” (Schlagwörter), or “basic concepts” (Grundbegriffe) without sharply distinguishing between them. Words that accumulated complex meanings and in which meanings are condensed can be called concepts. Concepts “are produced by a long-term semiotic process, which encompasses manifold and contradictory experiences. Such concepts may evoke complex, conflicting reactions and expectations.” They resist unambiguous definition and are open for interpretation and reinterpretation.

Words and concepts cannot be understood other than in their particular contexts since, as Koselleck explained, “a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context within which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word.” Therefore the use of words and concepts must be studied in their contexts; reversely the practical use of words allows us to understand a change within a context. Particularly between 1750 and 1850 – around Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and Industrial Revolution, a period that Koselleck called the “saddle time” (Sattelzeit) – many words strongly transformed their meanings or were invented. This can also be seen in architectural discourses of that time, with new words such as “function” or “tectonics,” among others, emerging.

Conceptual history is different from word history. The latter, searching for evidence of words in history, is less focused on the actual meaning or changes in meaning of a word, but rather on its emergence per se. By contrast, conceptual history necessarily asks for the context since only the context can clarify why a new term had come to existence. Conceptual history asks why a term occurred, not only whether it occurred. It makes sense to begin the analysis of a concept with a word history, for example by consulting etymological dictionaries, but only text analyses get you closer to the content and meaning of a word. It is Koselleck who leads the methodological way here as he “constantly insisted on the link between concepts and words. There is no doubt that for Koselleck, doing conceptual history entailed a word history, or rather a historical semantics, based on the study of the language in the sources (Quellensprache). He reiterated that historians have access to past concepts only through the words available in the sources.”

In other words, when a new concept enters the world, maybe because of an emerging need in a specific situation, it manifests itself in a word. Somebody felt a need to come up with a word to frame a new thought in a specific context that he or she thought to be helpful in reconsidering the context. The abundant appearance of a word might then give us a hint that the concept was strong. This also means that words, when used in an arisen need or new context, change their meaning. And again, since the meanings of ideas, concepts, discourses, and terms change in history, they cannot be defined like numbers or axioms, which are accepted to be unchangeably true. As Koselleck put it, quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, “only that which has no history can be defined.” Said differently, it is the reinterpretation of a word, its changed meaning, that helps us understand the concept and the need of a group of people to create it.
Conceptual history is different from discourse history, which studies a network of terms, rather than single or few words. It is also different from idea history, which goes beyond language and includes the investigation of material culture (artifacts). In all three fields we use words to speak about ideas, discourses, and concepts. In contrast to the history of ideas, both the history of discourses and the history of concepts focus their analyses on the “linguistic constitution of historical epochs as the topic of investigation.” But only in conceptual history do we try to nail the concept down to a word. The strength of conceptual history lies in the precise and narrow study of single or few words. This strength, however, can also be seen as its weakness, as conceptual history has often been criticized for this narrow view. On the other hand, there are also inherent risks in discourse history: Some terms, since they belong to the same discourse, might be considered interchangeable in that particular discourse, which could lead to broadened and potentially blurred interpretations of the terms. For both conceptual and discourse history, it is therefore helpful to collect words with similar meanings and compare them to detect nuances of their similarities and differences. The different advantages of conceptual and discourse history can thus be seen as follows: Focusing on single or few words makes it easier to compare a variety of texts, contexts, or epochs. And studying a discourse allows for a better understanding of the complexity of one particular context. As Daniel put it, conceptual history targets a “diachrone layer of change and continuity” while discourse history targets a “synchrone layer, that is of the respective presents.” As a final comment on the comparison of these three approaches, one can add that investigating the history of concepts has a stronger tradition in German-speaking countries, while investigating the history of discourses and ideas has its tradition in the French- and English-speaking parts of the world. The request that they should not be treated mutually exclusive has been going on for several decades. Pocock encouraged the two different cultures of conceptual and discourse history to “reinforce, stimulate, challenge, and enrich each other.” However, he pointed out, these two “modes of thought can be confronted, compared, and combined, but not homogenized.”

Let’s turn to architectural theory. On first glance, conceptual history and architectural theory seem to have reverse goals: Conceptual history wants to understand history by studying concepts. Architectural theory wants to understand concepts by studying history. For architectural theorists – and for architects, too – investigating the meaning of words in history does not originate from an interest in history, but from the desire to come up with one’s own position for the present. Radically speaking, architectural theorists do not even consider history as history, but as a theoretical construct that somebody could have come up with here and now.

The concept of “function” in architecture is a useful example to understand the differences between the histories of ideas, discourses, and concepts: In the history of architectural ideas, the word “function” is embedded in the effort to understand the architectural relationship of content and form. Theorists traced this idea of the relationship of content and form back to Vitruvius and thus interpreted the term “function” as Vitruvius’s “utilitas.” In a related, but more narrow effort that I would call discourse history, theorists studied the discourse of “functionalism” as it has emerged since High Modernism; here, they discussed a word family containing terms such as “purpose,” “task,” “utility,” “intention,” or “fitness,” which they claimed to be more or less synonymous with “function.” By doing so, the differences between the terms remained hidden. Using the approach of conceptual history, that is tracking the word “function” back to its first appearance in an architectural treatise – that turned out to be in the middle of the eighteenth century during what Koselleck called the Sattelzeit – showed that the introduction of the new word came with a critique of the existing architectural practices and the desire for a new understanding of building. Tracing the word in subsequent architectural treatises revealed that “function” started to be used interchangeably with “purpose” only in the early twentieth century. Only by focusing on how the word “function” alone was used in historical texts could differences to the content of other words be detected.
Surprisingly, the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* and similar works published subsequently remain relatively unspecific with respect to the question of how to analyze words and concepts. The entries in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* are described to have three parts: the first traces the history of a word or concept before modernity; the second, which is the main part, presents synchronic and diachronic analyses of texts; and the third refers to the use of a concept today. Beyond this description, no set of established or normative methods in conceptual history is apparent. The following is an attempt to collect such methods while bearing their usefulness for architectural theory in mind.

1. Most investigations of concepts, discourses, and ideas start with referencing dictionaries, and more specifically etymological dictionaries, that teach us the origins of particular words. Many words can be traced back to Greek or Latin origins with similar meanings to those of today; other words changed their meanings during the Sattelzeit (1750–1850); yet others were invented during that time; and words can undergo some or all of these processes in parallel. As a typical example for architecture, Kenneth Frampton explained:

   “Greek in origin, the term tectonic derives from the word *tekton*, signifying carpenter or builder. The corresponding verb is *tektainomai*. This in turn is related to the Sanskrit *taksan*, referring to the craft of carpentry and to the use of the axe. […] In the fifth century B.C. this meaning undergoes further evolution, from something specific and physical, such as carpentry, to a more generic notion of making, involving the idea of *poiesis*. […] Needless to say, the role of the tekton leads eventually to the emergence of the master builder or *architekton*. […] The first architectural use of the term in German dates from its appearance in Karl Otfried Müller’s *Handbuch der Archäologie der Kunst* (Handbook of the Archaeology of Art), published in 1830.”

While (etymological) dictionaries provide a first overview, it is important to understand that they only record the various definitions of words, but not the richness of different meanings within a concept. We cannot assume that all meanings of a word resonate with similar intensity in a concept, nor can we exclude particular meanings when investigating a concept. Also, while dictionaries list interpretations of different meanings of words – thus giving us hints that something happened with the word over time – they do not provide reasoning about how changes of meaning happened or why a desire for a new word emerged.

2. To arrive at a deeper understanding of a word’s evolution in meaning and its condensation to a concept, the word must be studied in specific contexts. Historical texts provide such contexts in which old and new terms can be compared. Koselleck suggested consulting references that he divided into three groups: first, the classic authors in a particular discipline; second, everyday literature of particular times such as newspapers, journals, pamphlets, letters, or diaries; and third, historical dictionaries and encyclopedias that explain how a word was understood at a specific time. To state it simply, this contextualist approach takes a specific word that is hypothesized to be a concept and attempts to find this word in these three groups of texts. The interdependence between concepts and discourses might be evident here, as both are verified through texts. As Koselleck put it, concepts “always function within a discourse, they are pivots around which all arguments turn. […] Each depends inescapably on the other. A discourse requires basic concepts in order to express what it is talking about. And analysis of concepts requires command of both linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, including those provided by discourses.” As an example, the architectural discourse of most of the nineteenth century circled around the concept of “style.” Among the many classic authors discussing the problem of style in architecture are James Fergusson (1808–1886) and John Ruskin (1819–1900) in Great Britain, Eugène Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc (1814–1879) in France, and Heinrich Hübsch (1795–1865) and Gottfried Semper (1805–1879) in Germany.
3. The selection of texts as stated above can still be vast and unspecific, which could become a central concern with respect to work load. If text samples are numerous, it can be helpful to limit the selection of texts to more focused contexts, such as:

   Time: Exploring if and how a specific term was used in a specific time period or epoch. Since Koselleck’s Sattelzeit hypothesis suggests that the meaning of many words changed between 1750 and 1850, it might be fruitful to compare texts before, during, and after that period.

   Geography: Investigating if and how a term was used in a specific local area (for example Italy or the New World).

   Social Context: Studying if and how a term was used in a specific social class or several social groups.

   Discipline: Analyzing if and how a term was used in specific scientific or artistic disciplines.

   Language: Examining if a term was evident in different languages and if it was used similarly or interpreted differently in them.

4. After having selected texts from specific contexts, the challenge of how to actually analyze them arises. The following set of questions is meant to help with this analysis:

   a) Was the word used here for the first time? Tracing when a word showed up for the first time in a particular context might provide a hint that there was a desire or attempt to reconsider a context. In this desire, “[p]articular words will then assume the role of key instruments in this process of challenging the old and inventing the new.” New words could thus indicate that new concepts were emerging.

   b) How frequently was a word used? Studying the frequency of a particular word might demonstrate if there was a concept (represented by a word) at all and, if so, potentially the concept’s strength. Digital collections are of tremendous value for determining a word’s frequency and whether it was used for the first time. The Early English Books Online (EEBO) database, for example, presents 150,000 English publications from 1475, when the first book in English was printed, to 1700. Other resources exist in several other languages.

c) Are synonyms used? Terms used in parallel? As an example in architecture for steps b and c, Heinz Hirdina pointed out that, as “a matter of conceptual history, the use of Zweck (purpose), Zweckmässigkeit (purposefulness), and other terms used in the early phase of the Werkbund decreased; they were replaced from the mid-1920s onward by function, functional, and, more rarely, functionalist.” We need to be careful not to conclude from this description that the phrase family of “function” was used synonymously with the phrase family of “purpose.” Rather, we could also raise the question as to whether “purpose” had become an insufficient concept leading to the desire to replace it by the new concept of “function.” We even have to consider, as a third alternative, that the concepts of “purpose” and “function” had nothing in common and were erroneously related by Hirdina.

d) Does the word address an opposite? Forty pointed out that new concepts often – or maybe even always – oppose an existing condition. He embedded this in a broader discussion about language: “The most fundamental distinction between language and image […] is that, as Saussure put it, ‘in language there are only differences.’ […] Whereas in language, the entire significance of the appellations ‘heavy’ or ‘complex’ belongs in the opposition to ‘light’ or ‘simple’, a drawing has no immediately recognizable opposite.” The potential step in the analysis of a text is therefore to explore if a particular concept reacted to an opposite. Forty added that often “only one side of the opposition receives much attention, the other being merely roughly indicated, or frequently not named at all, subsisting simply as inexplicit otherness,” and insisted that “part of any enquiry into critical terminology must involve consideration of their opposites.” As an example Forty traced the phrase of “masculine architecture” in historical discourses. The phrase was heavily used while its opposite “feminine” was often simply implied. And even when the reference did not appear any
further, Forty argued that it was still there; when Heinrich Wölfflin spoke, for example, about the body-space relationship, he would mean the male body.  

29. Is the word ambiguous? Does it allow different interpretations?  

f) Are there other words in the texts that create, in combination with the word under investigation, a “semantic field”? And is the investigated word in the “semantic center” of this “semantic field”? Ifversen suggested exploring “the most frequent words that occur next to our main word […] A closer look at the sentences – or even the paragraphs – in which we find the word should […] give us more information. […] we can also try to draw up a semantic field by examining, for instance, nouns that co-occur with our word. If we ask for the most frequent nouns within the distance of five words, we get an interesting list. […] Drawing up semantic fields demonstrates how the concentration of meaning operates at the semantic level.”

30. In eighteenth-century architectural discourse, for example, such a semantic field was created by the concepts of “the sublime,” “the solemn,” “the beautiful,” and “character,” with the first one being in the semantic center.

g) Is the word a “basic concept” (Grundbegriff) that is defined by Koselleck as “inescapable” and “irreplaceable” when it comes to the discussion of a particular topic? “Basic concepts combine manifold experiences and expectations in such a way that they become indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent issues of a given time. Thus basic concepts are highly complex; they are always both controversial and contested. It is this which makes them historically significant and sets them off from purely technical or professional terms.” The concept of “style” as described above works here as an example, too.

5. For each text it is important to investigate the addressee. This will help us understand if a particular concept has a specific clientele or if a concept was meant to influence a certain group of people.

6. After looking at one text, Koselleck suggested performing first a synchronic and then a diachronic investigation of a concept. Synchronic means comparing different texts in the same historical context, and diachronic refers to comparing texts as they developed over time. In a diachronic analysis, he explained that the concepts’ changing “meanings during successive periods of historical time are examined and relationships among these meanings are then assigned. […] Only in this way […] can we become aware of the social persistence of a meaning and the structures to which it corresponded.” Both synchronic and diachronic investigations might reveal similarities or differences in a word’s meanings. This stage can include asking when a word ceased to be used and what other terminology was used instead. It can also include, as Koselleck observed, the emergence of hyphenated words to increase specificity, when a word ceased to fit properly. As an example he provided “Social-Demokratie” resulting from an increased insufficiency of the word “democracy.” Comparably in 1960s architectural discourse, when the term “functionalism” was increasingly criticized, hyphenated and extended words such as “neo-functionalism” (Mario Gandelsonas), “mono-functionalism” (Elmar Holenstein), “naïve functionalism” (Aldo Rossi), or “construction industry functionalism” (Heinrich Klotz) occurred.

7. In addition, texts of different disciplines can be compared. If a word was used in several disciplines and social contexts and was therefore widely known, we can hypothesize that it had become a basic concept. Looking into other disciplines can also help find the origin of a particular concept, since each time has fields that dominate the thinking of other fields. As an example, natural history, a dominant field in the nineteenth century, strongly influenced many other fields, including architecture; words such as “organism,” “fitness,” “taxonomy,” or “circulation,” quickly spread from natural history to architecture. This process of metaphorical transfer of words from one discipline to another can be seen in all architectural discourses. Describing architectural works as “machines” during the Industrial Revolution and High Modernism or adopting linguistic concepts such as “grammar” during Post-modernism are only two more examples. Metaphors can also originate from
architectural terminology, such as when we speak about the “architects” of the constitution, the principles of freedom and equality as the “foundation” of democracy, or the state as a “house.” In this case, we would look at discourses of other disciplines, rather than our own.  

Outcomes and Limitations of Using Methods of Conceptual History for Architectural Theory

Building on a thought from the beginning of this essay, using the methods of conceptual history for architectural research does not necessarily mean that the outcome is a contribution to history. Whether the outcomes of such investigations are contributions to history, theory, or both is entirely up to the researcher. Architectural historians and theorists, while seemingly doing the same thing when investigating words and concepts in history, have different foci. The historian’s focus is to understand past architectural epochs and their transformations; the theorist’s focus is to clarify theoretical frameworks regarding their relevance for current architecture. While both are interested in past and present, the historian’s target is the past and the theorist’s one is the present.  

Second, to take a broader view for a moment, in architectural theory we can generally study three areas: texts (treatises, correspondences, etc.); objects (architectural works, artifacts, environments) including how people use and perceive them; and drawings, models, videos, or other mainly visual representations of architecture. Each of these realms require specialized methods and strategies of analysis and each will give us different insights. This also means that focusing on studying words, texts, or discourses ignores the insights we might receive from studying the other two realms. Compared to studying objects (such as actual buildings) it becomes evident that by thinking through texts, we cannot gain an actual direct experience of architectural spaces, surfaces, masses, and atmospheres. Compared to studying drawings, models, and other representations it is evident that thinking through texts limits our insights in non-verbal thinking. In other words, the approach presented here addresses the abstract verbal thinking about and conceptualization of architecture. Only secondary is this approach about the experience of concrete architectural spaces, structures, and atmospheres, and their extra-linguistic abstractions. Some architects and theorists might argue for the superiority of one of the three realms. Forty hoped to see them all equal to each other, “to see drawings not so much as deficient versions of things, but as equal, though different realities. Could we not, then, think of verbal remarks about architecture in similar terms?” To go even further, beyond respecting different ways of analysis and making the effort to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each, an additional step would be to understand how the three realms are related to each other. Such relationships are manifold: many architectural texts speak directly about actual buildings and the experience they provoke; other texts can be visually diagrammed for a more intuitive understanding. Koselleck, in speaking about linguistics, raised the question what comes first, the object or the word? He argued that language, on the one hand, observes “receptively – the world as it exists pre-verbal and non-verbal” and, on the other hand, appropriates “actively – all extra-linguistic objects and facts.”  

Similarly in architecture, while a concept (expressed in a word) in an architectural text can describe an architectural composition (for example, as evident in a drawing) or experience (for example, of a built space), it can also influence or change a composition or an experience of a built work. In the first case the concept succeeds, in the second it precedes. More general: Words and texts in the realm of abstract thinking can influence building (but do not have to); buildings in the realm of concrete experiences can influence writing (but do not have to); and drawings and representations in the realm of non-verbal abstraction might be able to communicate the other two. In the context of our investigation of adopting conceptual history for architectural theory, we must acknowledge that our chosen method is limited when it comes to approaching the pre- and extra-linguistic. However, is there architecture without speaking about it, without some verbalized conceptualization? Does architecture come into existence only when we become aware of a need for abstract thoughts on building, and thus for concepts? Can we even say:
Without concepts no architecture? Beyond the already huge efforts of going through many texts, discourses, and contexts, studying the relationship of concepts to objects and representations opens up other broad fields of investigation. Methods for analyzing these relationships will be more difficult to specify.
Notes

4 Daniel 2004, p. 350 (German).
5 Ifversen 2011, p. 69.
7 Koselleck 1996, p. 64.
8 Koselleck 2004, p. 95.
9 Ifversen 2011, p. 72.
10 Ifversen 2011, p. 74: “A word becomes a concept precisely because it gets involved in action stemming from a certain situation or context. It is made into a concept by speaking and writing actors.”
13 For example Pocock 1996.
15 Cf. Melvin Richter: “I argue that to add the conceptual histories found in the GG to the projects of Pocock and Skinner would provide a more nearly satisfactory historical account of political and social thought and language. But it is also the case that an adequate linguistic synthesis of the concepts treated separately in the GG might necessitate both Pocock’s strategy of seeking the overall patterns of the political languages used in given times and places and Skinner’s emphases upon the types of legitimation made possible or restricted by the linguistic conventions and political intentions of writers regarded as active agents or actors.” (Lehman and Richter 1996, p. 17).
17 For example, Ligo 1984, p. 5.
20 For example, Reichardt, Schmitt, et. al. 1985–.
22 Cf. Koselleck 1972, p. XIX, translated in Pernau and Sachsenmaier 2016, p. 40: “Understanding how the origins of distinctively modern times were conceptually registered is possible only if we pay especially close attention both to earlier meanings of the words investigated and to those changes that required the new formulations.”
24 Ifversen 2011, p. 74–75.
26 Hirdina 2001, p. 596 (German).
28 Ibid., p. 44, 61.
30 Ifversen 2011, p. 85.
31 Koselleck 1996, p. 64.
33 Koselleck 1972, p. XXIII.
34 Poerschke 2016, p. 175–183.
35 For “circulation” see Forty 2000, p. 87–94; for “organism” see German 1972.
36 See, for example, Purdy 2011.
37 Cf. Ifversen 2011, p. 75–76, 82: “Conceptual historians [...] are interested in the historical role of concepts in certain conjunctures and contexts. [...] The main interest of historians, however, is change over time. They might work with notions of historical stability, namely historical periods, but their main interest is to determine when things change. Conceptual historians are interested in describing and explaining conceptual change.” With respect to the historian Koselleck, Ifversen explained: “Koselleck himself was mainly interested in locating when and how the basic concepts made their way into twentieth-century political and social vocabulary in Western Europe. He wanted to locate that period in time out of which Western Europe’s political and social modernity grew.” (2011, p. 75).
38 Forty 2000, p. 33.
39 Koselleck 2006, p. 61 (German).
40 I adapted this thought from Ifversen 2011, p. 67–68. “We can, for instance, feel hunger or pain without language. But to communicate these feelings we normally rely on language. When it comes to abstract thoughts about presidents and the like, we are totally dependent on language. [...] Without common concepts there is no society, and above all, no political field of action.”